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Abstract
For over a decade Israel has been 
strengthening links with Arab Gulf states 
with which it has no diplomatic relations. 
Evidence of a convergence of Israel’s stra-
tegic views with those of Saudi Arabia, the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain 
has accumulated as all displayed hostility 
to Iran’s regional ambitions and to United 
States President Barack Obama’s policies 
during the Arab Spring. Israeli Prime Min-
ister Benjamin Netanyahu has highlighted 
the Iranian threat and has felt much greater 
room for foreign policy manoeuvre given 
the continued marginalisation of the Pal-
estinians. Netanyahu, who opposes an 
independent Palestinian state, has been 
greatly encouraged by the policies of US 
President Donald Trump. Long-standing 
Israeli security and commercial ties with 
the Gulf, already becoming more visible, 
look set to develop further, though overt 
military cooperation is improbable. Geo-
political and generational changes have 
made their mark among Gulf elites but the 
rivalry with Iran as well as domestic and 
pan-Arab public opinion will constrain 
any normalisation of Saudi and allied 
relations with Israel, assuming there is no 
progress towards an acceptable resolu-
tion of the Palestinian issue. None seems 
likely for the foreseeable future.
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1 
Introduction
No formal relations currently exist between Israel and the six members of the Gulf Coop-
eration Council (GCC), led by Saudi Arabia. Israel, by contrast, has peace treaties with 
two of its neighbours, Egypt and Jordan, signed in 1979 and 1994, the latter in the wake 
of the 1993 Oslo Agreement with the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). Over the 
last dozen years, however, links between Israel and several GCC states have developed to 
the extent that they have transformed the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East. Over 
roughly the same period, prospects for an acceptable resolution of the Palestinian ques-
tion have deteriorated insofar as a two-state solution, which enjoys broad international 
and Arab support, has little chance of being reached.
Significant changes began in the mid-1990s when Qatar and Oman (with Tunisia and 
Morocco) established trade relations with Israel on the grounds that a peace process, 
albeit an interim one, was under way between Israel and the PLO.2 These public con-
nections were severed in the wake of the Second Intifada in 2000, though discreet ties 
continued. Wider developments also began to alter regional dynamics.
1   Raphael Ahren, ‘Netanyahu hails “best-ever” ties to Arab world’, Times of Israel, 6 September 2017. 
Available at https://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-hails-best-ever-ties-to-arab-world/ (accessed 6 
March 2019). 
2   Mauritania established diplomatic relations with Israel in 1999 and severed them in 2010.
What is happening in practice with Arab states has never happened 
in our history, even when we signed peace agreements. In practice, 
cooperation in different ways and at different levels isn’t necessarily 
(visible) above the surface, but what is below the surface is far greater 
than at any other period in Israel’s history. It is a huge change.
    Benjamin Netanyahu, September 20171
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Common hostility to Iran and its allies is the main factor. Others include the growing 
perception of US disengagement from the Middle East, the emergence of assertively 
nationalist rulers in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), divisions between 
Arab states, impatience with the divided Palestinians and a realisation in Gulf capitals of 
the benefits of security, economic and technological links with an unassailably powerful 
Israel, both for their own sake and because of the US approval that brings. Israel’s gains 
too are clear, if limited by comparison.
This paper traces the convergence of views and interests between Israel and the Gulf 
states. It argues that there are constraints on public links because of the emotive power 
of the unresolved Palestinian issue, even if GCC members did little more than pay it lip 
service in the past. The paper shows that Israeli officials recognise that fact but still work 
to promote multiple connections with what are defined as ‘moderate Sunni states’, and 
suggests that the Second Lebanon War of 2006 marked a step change in this continuing 
process.
In the wake of that conflict, then Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert met Saudi Arabia’s 
National Security Adviser Bandar bin Sultan, providing a rare if unintended glimpse of 
a still largely secret relationship. Exposure of that encounter, denied in Riyadh, enraged 
the Saudis.3 Olmert tellingly made no reference to seeing Bandar when he published his 
memoirs. Israel’s clandestine relations with Arab countries are considered a national 
security issue by the military censorship authorities and a ministerial committee that vets 
publications by officials and politicians. Secrecy is a central element in a set of connec-
tions that have to a considerable degree changed the Middle East.
The Arab Peace Initiative
The Olmert–Bandar meeting did not take place in a vacuum. The 11 September 2001 
al-Qaida attacks marked a geopolitical nadir for the Saudis, who tried to limit the damage 
by adopting a more pragmatic approach to Israel. In March 2002, at the height of the 
Second Intifada, Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz launched what became the Arab 
Peace Initiative (API). This represented the most ambitious collective Arab response to 
Israel to date. It offered Israel recognition by the Arab League’s 22 members in return for 
a full withdrawal to the 1967 borders, the establishment of a Palestinian state with East 
Jerusalem as its capital, and a ‘just’ and ‘agreed upon’ solution to the refugee question. 
The timing, however, was catastrophic – announced at a Beirut summit on the day a Pales-
tinian suicide bombing killed 30 elderly Israelis celebrating Passover. Responses in Israel 
mainly ranged from the lukewarm to the openly hostile.4
Other developments contributed to the convergence of views between Israel and several 
3   Interview, former Israeli intelligence official.
4   Caroline Glick, ‘Our World: Olmert’s Saudi Friends’, Jerusalem Post, 4 December 2006. Available at 
https://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/Our-World-Olmerts-Saudi-friends (accessed 6 March 
2019).
Israel, the Arab Gulf States and the Limits of Cooperation 7 
Arab states. Exposure in 2002 of Iran’s secret uranium enrichment facility at Natanz 
(likely leaked by Israel)5 was followed in 2003 by Tehran’s empowerment in the wake of 
the US-led invasion of Iraq. This sharpened the focus on the Islamic Republic’s influence 
and aspirations, including a potential threat to Israel’s undeclared nuclear monopoly. In 
2004, King Abdullah II of Jordan warned of the appearance of a ‘Shiʿa crescent’ across the 
region.6 The assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005 appeared from 
the start to implicate Syria and the Iranian-backed Hezbollah. In January 2006 Syrian Pres-
ident Bashar al-Assad held his first meeting in Damascus with his recently-elected Iranian 
counterpart, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. In December, at the Mecca summit of the Organ-
isation of the Islamic Conference, Ahmadinejad denied the Holocaust in ‘a brazen act of 
one-upmanship that left the Al Saud [House of Saud] mortified and unable to respond’.7
The Second Lebanon war of 2006, in which Hezbollah inflicted serious blows to superior 
Israeli forces, boosted concerns about challenges from Tehran, whether defined in sec-
tarian terms or not. In July of that year a Saudi official condemned Hezbollah’s incursion 
and the abduction of two Israeli soldiers, describing it not as ‘legitimate resistance’ but a 
‘miscalculated adventure’. That statement was believed to be the work of Bandar, ‘a loose 
cannon’ acting without authorisation.8 The Saudi foreign ministry then condemned Israel 
and demanded an immediate ceasefire in Lebanon.9 ‘There seemed to be a common inter-
est in dealing Hezbollah and in parenthesis Iran a serious blow’, recalled Daniel Kurtzer, 
US Ambassador to Israel until 2005, ‘but it was only later when the Israeli response was 
seen to be too harsh that the Arabs started backing off ’.10 Saudi clerics ‘seized upon the 
war to highlight the caution, immobility, impiety and – some cases, illegitimacy – of the 
Saudi regime’.11 In August, Assad said the conflict had exposed ‘half men’ (ashbah al rijal) 
– a pejorative reference to the opposition of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan to Hezbollah. 
Olmert’s meeting with Bandar came as Israel was reportedly making efforts to discuss 
the Shiʿa threat and the Saudis’ ideas for peace. One unconfirmed report also described 
a meeting at this time in Aqaba between Bandar, the head of Jordanian intelligence 
and Mossad Director Meir Dagan, who agreed to ‘build up and accelerate intelligence 
exchanges’ to deal with Iranian threats.12 
5   Jeffrey Lewis, ‘That Secret Iranian “Nuclear Facility” You Just Found? Not So Much’, Foreign Policy, 
3 March 2015. Available at https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/03/that-secret-iranian-nuclear-facility-
you-just-found-not-so-much/ (accessed 6 March 2019) 
6   King Abdullah II of Jordan, Our Last Best Chance: The Pursuit of Peace in a Time of Peril (London: 
Penguin Books, 2012), pp. 280–2.
7   Frederic Wehrey, Theodore W. Karasik, Alireza Nader, Jeremy Ghez, Lydia Hansell, Robert A. 
Guffey, ‘Saudi-Iranian Relations Since the Fall of Saddam: Rivalry, Cooperation, and Implications for 
U.S. Policy’, RAND Corporation (2009), p. 24. Available at https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/
pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG840.pdf (accessed 6 March 2019). 
8   Interviews, former British diplomats.
9   David Ottaway, The King’s Messenger: Prince Bandar bin Sultan and America’s Tangled Relationship with 
Saudi Arabia (New York: Walker & Company, 2008), pp. 255–6.
10   Interview, Daniel Kurtzer, US ambassador to Israel, 2001–5.
11   Wehrey et al., ‘Saudi-Iranian Relations Since the Fall of Saddam’, p. 24.
12   ‘A Secret Regional Alliance Against Iran’, Intelligence Online, 20 October 2006. Available at https://
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Ongoing Interpretation
Known events like the Olmert–Bandar encounter are few and far between. But that does 
not mean that the development of Israeli–Gulf links cannot be traced, at least in broad 
outline, though this does require careful and ongoing interpretation. There is a consensus 
in academic research and serious media coverage of the Middle East that these ties reflect 
changing geopolitical realities,13 though often without elaboration. Understanding is com-
plicated by the fact that the issue is discussed relatively openly in Israel but is still taboo, 
albeit to different degrees, in Arab states. 
If 2006 was a key year, the convergence of regional positions became more apparent in 
2007.14 It grew during the Arab Spring and Obama’s second term, and accelerated along 
with the Syrian Civil War and Iran’s involvement in it. US Secretary of State John Kerry 
noted that the ‘new alignment of interests between Israel and the Sunni Arab countries in 
the region against Iran presented an opportunity to shuffle the deck.’15 The trend contin-
ued with negotiations for the Iran nuclear deal (JCPoA) of 2015 and after Trump entered 
the White House in January 2017, carrying out his threat to withdraw from the JCPoA in 
May 2018. Netanyahu’s visit to Oman in October 2018 for talks with Sultan Qaboos bin 
Said, accompanied by the head of the Mossad, was a recent high-profile landmark.
Nevertheless, there is a sharp imbalance of attitudes between the two sides as well as 
important distinctions between the Arab states involved. Israel has had a clear interest in 
deliberately advertising this rapprochement but without revealing secrets – as illustrated 
by Netanyahu’s statement quoted at the beginning of this paper. ‘It’s very carefully drafted 
to give a positive message without spilling the beans’, explained Dore Gold, former foreign 
ministry director general.16 Arabs repeatedly complain that Israeli leaks or indiscretions 
ignore their sensitivities. Gold and other Israelis counter that they generally keep quiet out 
of respect for the wishes of the other side.17 
The relationship between Israel’s attitude to the Palestinians and its ties with the wider 
Arab world is a theme that goes back to the early days of the Zionist enterprise. The fun-
damental aspiration since 1948 has been to establish discreet relations with Arab states 
and to thus bypass, pressure or weaken the Palestinians. In the past, the Gulf side – Saudi 
www.intelligenceonline.com/political-intelligence/2006/10/20/a-secret-regional-alliance-against-
iran,23406406-eve (accessed 6 March 2019). 
13   ‘The Saudi Revolution Begins: How to ensure Muhammad bin Salman’s reforms succeed’, The 
Economist, 23 June 2018; René Rieger, Saudi Arabian Foreign Relations: Diplomacy and Mediation in Conflict 
Resolution (New York: Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics, 2017), pp. 23–4.
14   Giorgio Cafiero and Andrea Petrelli, ‘What’s all this Talk about a Gulf-Israel Alliance?’, Huffington 
Post, 22 May 2017. Available at https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/whats-all-this-talk-about-a-
gulf-israel-alliance_us_5923d188e4b0b28a33f62f26 (accessed 6 March 2019). 
15   John Kerry, Every Day is Extra (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2018), p. 443.
16   Interview, Dore Gold.
17   Reuters, ‘Israel Has Secret Contacts with Saudi Arabia, Senior Minister Reveals’, Haaretz, 20 
November 2017. Available at https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/israel-has-secret-contacts-with-
saudi-arabia-senior-minister-reveals-1.5466779 (accessed 6 March 2019).
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Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain (in order of importance) – shunned exposure of links with 
Israel because of the risk of backlash from domestic, Arab and Muslim public opinion 
over ‘normalisation’ (tatbiʿ) with the Jewish state. That has changed to some extent in 
recent years. Qatar has long behaved more independently, and more so since the start 
of the blockade imposed by the ‘anti-terrorist’ quartet of Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain and 
Egypt in June 2017. So has Oman, which has closer relations with Iran than its fellow GCC 
members.
Still, with occasional exceptions, secrecy and deniability about dealing with Israel, however 
implausible, remain the norm. That means it is difficult to confirm media reports which 
may be motivated by the escalating divisions and polarisation of inter-Arab and Middle 
Eastern politics. Propaganda, misinformation and deliberate opacity are significant barri-
ers to understanding.18 However, these were part of the story long before the idea of ‘fake 
news’ began to attract the attention it has recently been enjoying.
Three Levels
Israeli officials describe their current approach to the Arab world as operating on three 
levels: the first is secret security, intelligence and military cooperation – underpinned by 
public messaging and diplomatic strategies. The second level involves trade, including 
hi-tech, and plans for regional transport links. The third, less significant but more visible, 
is classified as people-to-people, i.e. sporting or cultural contacts.
The general lack of substantive details and the conflation of all Arab countries in public 
statements by Netanyahu mean that the first category is especially opaque. It is widely 
agreed, for example, that Israel’s role in fighting the Islamic State (ISIS) in Egypt’s Sinai 
Peninsula since 2015 – providing intelligence and deploying drones and fighter aircraft 
– has brought military cooperation with Egypt to an unprecedented level, making the 
neighbours ‘secret allies in a covert war against a common foe’ – despite Egyptian denials.19 
Israel’s security relations with Jordan are also extremely close. But that does not mean 
there is a similar level of military cooperation with Saudi Arabia, or, further afield, with 
Morocco.20
Israeli politicians and officials occasionally refer to intelligence coordination with Arab 
states regarding Iran and counter-terrorism. In November 2017, Israel Defense Forces 
(IDF) Chief of Staff Lt General Gadi Eisenkot made headlines when he offered to share 
18   ‘Iranian Regime-Linked Media Claims Israeli F16s are in Saudi Arabia’, Times of Israel, 22 June 2017. 
Available at https://www.timesofisrael.com/iranian-regime-linked-media-claims-israeli-f16s-are-in-
saudi-arabia/ (accessed 6 March 2019)
19   David D. Kirkpatrick, ‘Secret Alliance: Israel Carries Out Airstrikes in Egypt, with Cairo’s O.K.’, New 
York Times, 3 February 2018. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/03/world/middleeast/
israel-airstrikes-sinai-egypt.html (accessed 6 March 2019). 
20   ‘Israel–Morocco Relations: Opportunities to Advance Cooperation’, MITVIM, August 2018. 
Available at http://www.mitvim.org.il/images/Israel-Morocco_Relations_-_Opportunities_to_
Advance_Cooperation_-_August_2018.pdf (accessed 6 March 2019).
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intelligence on Iran with Saudi Arabia – noting that the two countries shared ‘many 
common interests’.21 Western sources confirm the existence of such cooperation in the 
Gulf, but its nature and extent remain largely unknown. ‘The Israeli intelligence folks who 
have gone to these countries have met the leaders’, said a former senior US diplomat. 
‘They know each other fairly well’.22 Obama’s Secretary of State Hillary Clinton ‘knew that 
the UAE and Saudi Arabia were … working together behind the scenes with the Mossad to 
counter Iranian influence’.23 
According to a former senior Saudi official, cooperation increased markedly during 
Obama’s second term. ‘The Obama administration was hated by the Saudis and the 
Israelis. In a sense, it shunned them both. In response they deepened their cooperation. 
Exchanging intelligence is very important – comparing their findings to know exactly what 
is going on with Hezbollah, Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood and suspicious activities in 
the Red Sea.’24 A former Israeli official makes precisely the same point: ‘What made the 
politics of it acute was Obama. There was a sense that we were looking at an American 
administration that wasn’t as committed to America’s traditional friends. We had to make 
common cause because there was a sense of being left alone to fend for ourselves. Unwit-
tingly, Obama contributed very significantly to the build-up of relations between us and 
the UAE and the Saudis.’25
Projects for regional economic cooperation are more public if they involve Egypt or 
Jordan, but the long-standing Arab League boycott of Israel is now only ‘sporadically 
applied and ambiguously enforced’.26 Israel’s publicly available foreign trade data does 
not show any direct trade in recent years with countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE 
but an analysis of goods flows via third countries suggest the true amount is ‘close to’ $1 
billion annually with the potential for growth of up to $25 billion.27
Contacts involving sporting, cultural and religious events run counter to what little 
remains of the Arab League boycott and the programme of the Boycott, Disinvestment 
and Sanctions (BDS) movement which has made advances in Europe and the US in recent 
21   Majdi al-Halabi, ‘Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces to “Elaph”: No Intention to Attack 
Hezbollah in Lebanon’ [in Arabic], Elaph, 16 November 2017. Available at https://elaph.com/Web/
News/2017/11/1177142.html (accessed 6 March 2019).
22   Interview, former senior US State Department official.
23   Adam Entous, ‘Donald’s Trump New World Order’, The New Yorker, 18 June 2018. Available at 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/06/18/donald-trumps-new-world-order (accessed 6 
March 2019). 
24   Interview, former senior Saudi official.
25   Interview, Eran Lerman, former deputy Israeli national security adviser.
26   Martin A. Weiss, ‘Arab League Boycott of Israel’, Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, 
25 August 2017. Available at https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=804229 (accessed 6 March 2019). 
27   ‘Assessing Israel’s Trade with its Arab Neighbours’, Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, August 
2018. Available at https://institute.global/insight/middle-east/assessing-israels-trade-its-arab-
neighbours/ (accessed 6 March 2019). 
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years.28 How much these three existing (and to some extent overlapping) areas of coop-
eration are likely to develop in the future depends on the domestic constraints facing 
Arab states, Iranian behaviour and US policy – but above all on the state of the Palestinian 
question when once automatic pan-Arab solidarity, at least at the declaratory level, can no 
longer be taken for granted.
Overall Israeli–Gulf relations have been characterised as a ‘tacit security regime’29 and 
‘tacit cooperation’.30 Yet it remains unclear how a de facto alliance or even joint opera-
tions could be turned into a wider strategy, for example in a clash with Iran or another 
war between Israel and Hezbollah. The unilateral reimposition of US sanctions on Tehran 
in 2018 continues to carry the risk that Iran may retaliate by withdrawing from the JCPoA 
and blocking the Strait of Hormuz, a potential scenario for joint or coordinated US–Gulf–
Israeli military action.31 In August 2018, Netanyahu publicly warned, after Houthi rebel 
missile attacks on Saudi tankers, that Israel would deploy its military as part of an ‘inter-
national coalition’ if Iran were to block the Bab el-Mandeb strait that links the Red Sea 
to the Gulf of Aden and controls access to the southern Israeli port of Eilat.32 The Saudi 
announcement of a ‘Red Sea entity’ to protect maritime security reflected apparently 
similar thinking, though without mention of Israel.33 Israeli threats to hit Iranian military 
assets, including short-range ballistic missiles in Iraq – as it has repeatedly done in Syria 
– were another indication of readiness to widen the regional confrontation.34 The US-or-
ganised Warsaw Middle East conference in February 2019 deliberately focused attention 
on Israeli and Gulf hostility to Iran. It allowed Netanyahu to publicly appear alongside 
Saudi, Emirati and Bahraini ministers or officials and to argue that all had spoken ‘with 
unusual force, clarity and unity against the common threat of the Iranian regime’.35
28   Nathan Thrall, ‘BDS: How a Controversial Non-Violent Movement has Transformed the Israeli–
Palestinian Debate’, The Guardian, 14 August 2018. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/
news/2018/aug/14/bds-boycott-divestment-sanctions-movement-transformed-israeli-palestinian-
debate (accessed 6 March 2019).
29   Clive Jones and Yoel Guzansky, ‘Israel’s Relations with the Gulf States: Toward the Emergence of 
a Tacit Security Regime?’, Contemporary Security Policy 38/3 (February 2017), pp. 398–419. Available at 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2017.1292375 (accessed 6 March 2019). 
30   Uzi Rabi and Chelsi Mueller, ‘The Gulf Arab States and Israel since 1967: From “no Negotiation” 
to Tacit Cooperation’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 44/4 (September 2017), pp. 576–92. 
Available at https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2017.1360013 (accessed 6 March 2019). 
31   Interview, Oded Eran, former Israeli ambassador to Jordan.
32   ‘Israel Warns Iran of Military Response if it Closed Key Red Sea Strait’, Reuters, 1 August 2018. 
Available at https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-israel-redsea/israel-warns-iran-of-military-response-if-
it-closed-key-red-sea-strait-idUKKBN1KM5VA (accessed 6 March 2019). 
33   ‘Saudi Arabia, Red Sea and Gulf of Aden States Reach Agreement for Cooperation’, Arab News, 12 
December 2018. Available at http://www.arabnews.com/node/1419711/saudi-arabia (accessed 6 March 
2019).
34   ‘Israel Signals it Could Attack Iranian Weaponry in Iraq’, Reuters, 3 September 2018. Available at 
https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-israel-iran-iraq/israel-signals-it-could-attack-iranian-weaponry-in-
iraq-idUKKCN1LJ0QF (accessed 6 March 2019). 
35   Patrick Wintour and Oliver Holmes, ‘Mike Pence Chides US Allies at Warsaw Summit on Iran’, The 
Guardian, 14 February 2019. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/14/us-and-
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Israel and the UAE
In 2018, Israel’s only declared governmental presence in the Gulf was with the Inter-
national Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) in Abu Dhabi. Israel’s envoy, uniquely, is 
accredited solely to IRENA, not to the UAE, a fact emphasised by both countries when 
the mission opened in 2015. Israel lobbied for the UAE to host the new body in return for 
agreement to an Israeli presence.36 It marked the first time in nearly two decades that any 
official Israeli mission had been opened in an Arab country. In 2013 the Israeli foreign 
ministry launched an Arabic-language @IsraelintheGulf Twitter channel, part of a growing 
commitment to digital diplomacy. It stopped being used in 2014 but was re-launched as a 
‘virtual embassy’ at a time of intensifying activity in early 2019.37 
Israel’s links with the UAE are the most extensive within any of the Gulf states – ‘pragmatic, 
transactional, technical’ – and not always concealed.38 Chairman of the Israeli Labour Party 
Avi Gabbay held talks with senior officials in Abu Dhabi in late 2018.39 Netanyahu is also 
believed to have met Emirati leaders in Cyprus in 2015 to discuss how to tackle Iran after 
the signing of the JCPoA.40 High-level contacts were already routine. In 2009, UAE Foreign 
Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed was reported to have ‘good personal relations’ with 
his former Israeli counterpart, Tzipi Livni. The UAE ‘believes in Israel’s role because of 
their perception of Israel’s close relationship with the United States, but also due to their 
sense that they can count on Israel against Iran’, an Israeli diplomat told a US colleague, 
adding that Gulf Arabs ‘believe Israel can work magic’.41 US Congressional opposition to 
the Dubai Port Worlds bid to run American ports in 2006 may have galvanised the Emi-
ratis to deal more directly with Israel.42 Problems over a secret deal to sell Israeli drones 
to the UAE in 2009 reportedly caused a deep rift in relations that was only resolved two 
years later.43
Publicly there was a sensational setback in January 2010, when Mossad agents assassi-
israel-say-confrontation-with-iran-needed-for-peace (accessed 6 March 2019). 
36   Barak Ravid, ‘Exclusive: Israel to Open First Diplomatic Mission in Abu Dhabi’, Haaretz, 27 
November 2015. Available at https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-israel-to-open-
diplomatic-mission-in-abu-dhabi-1.5426578 (accessed 6 March 2019). 
37   Barak Ravid, ‘Israel Opens a “Virtual Embassy” to Gulf States’, Haaretz, 21 July 2013. Available at 
https://www.haaretz.com/.premium-israel-opens-gulf-virtual-embassy-1.5297843 (accessed 6 March 
2019). 
38   Interview, former British diplomat.
39   Barak Ravid, ‘Leader of Israeli Labor Party Made Secret Visit to UAE’, Axios, 7 January 2019. Available 
at https://www.axios.com/leader-of-the-israeli-labor-party-visited-uae-a87c95f8-c6da-4ee1-8628-
8573da659328.html (accessed 6 March 2019).
40   Entous, ‘Donald’s Trump New World Order’.
41   ‘Israel’s Relations with the Gulf States Focus on Iran, Perception of Israeli Influence in Washington’, 
Wikileaks, 19 March 2009. Available at https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09TELAVIV654_a.html 
(accessed 6 March 2019). 
42   Sigurd Neubauer, ‘Israel: A Strategic Partner for the UAE?’, Gulf State Analytics, 9 November 2017. 
Available at https://gulfstateanalytics.com/israel-strategic-partner-uae/ (accessed 6 March 2019). 
43   Barak Ravid, ‘Exclusive: The Secret Drone Deal that Created an Israel–UAE Rift’, Axios, 11 February 
2019. Available at https://www.axios.com/secret-drone-deal-israel-uae-iran-netanyahu-mbz-
48caa235-1ed8-45fe-b691-b9bd41223ebb.html (accessed 6 March 2019).
Israel, the Arab Gulf States and the Limits of Cooperation 13 
nated a Hamas operative, Mahmoud al-Mabhouh, in a Dubai hotel. Mabhouh was Hamas’ 
arms procurement link with Iran. The row that followed included a ban on anyone iden-
tified as Israeli entering the country, even on a foreign passport. But it was soon back to 
normal for discreet diplomacy and business.44 ‘In such cases, you simply keep your head 
down and wait until it all blows over,’ said a Swiss-based Israeli who brokers deals in the 
Middle East. ‘You need to be sensitive... You simply stop, not even sending emails, until 
the tide turns.’45 In December 2013, Israeli President Shimon Peres spoke from his Jerusa-
lem office via satellite to 29 foreign ministers from Arab and Muslim countries at the Gulf 
Security Conference in Abu Dhabi. Israel’s minister of energy visited Abu Dhabi in 2014.
Known military cooperation has involved joint participation in exercises in the US and 
Greece. In August 2016, pilots from Israel and the UAE took part in a training exercise 
with pilots from Pakistan and Spain in the US. In 2017, the Israel and UAE air forces held 
a joint exercise with the air forces of the US, Italy and Greece. In 2018 UAE military offi-
cials reportedly visited an air base in southern Israel to review the operations of advanced 
US-made F-35 fighter jets, though this was denied by Israel.46 Clandestine cooperation is 
thought to include Israeli intelligence surveillance of Iran and the supply of drones used 
in Yemen.47 Israel has reportedly granted the UAE access to the Israeli-built Eros B satellite 
and its high-resolution imagery.48
‘Pragmatic, Transactional, Technical’
The largest and most visible element of the Israel–UAE relationship is in business and 
trade, though no official statistics are available in either country. Israeli businessmen, 
using foreign passports, fly there regularly. ‘There is a huge amount of business going on’, 
says the Israeli representative of a multinational company who has an EU passport and 
regularly visits the UAE.49 Research shows a focus on hi-tech, especially cybersecurity, 
irrigation technologies, medical supplies and the diamond industry.50 AGT International, 
owned by Israeli businessman Matti Kochavi, has reportedly supplied drones, electronic 
fences and surveillance equipment worth $800m to protect the UAE’s borders and oil-
44   Interview, Dore Gold.
45   Shuki Sadeh, ‘The Badly Kept Secret of Israel’s Trade Throughout the Muslim World’, Haaretz, 
19 January 2012. Available at https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/business/1.5167882 (accessed 6 
March 2019). 
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8 July 2018. Available at https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Israel-denies-UAE-delegation-visited-
Israel-to-study-the-F-35-561913 (accessed 6 March 2019). 
47   Interviews, Israeli and US sources.
48   Neubauer, ‘Israel: A Strategic Partner for the UAE?’.
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50   Ron Friedman, ‘Israelis doing Business in Dubai will Wait out Storm’, Jerusalem Post, 3 March 
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fields under the ‘Falcon Eye’ programme.51 Emirati officials describe this as a non-political 
decision motivated by national security interests.52 AGT, like many private Israeli secu-
rity companies, employs retired IDF officers. In 2014, Haaretz newspaper tracked a 
mysterious weekly flight between Tel Aviv and Dubai.53 In 2016 the software company 
NSO Group was licensed by Israel’s defence export controls agency to sell a surveillance 
app to the UAE and faced embarrassment when it was used to target a human rights activ-
ist.54 The same firm reportedly supplied software to track members of the Qatari royal 
family.55 Israeli businesses operate in the UAE via companies registered in Europe. Bills of 
lading are produced from an intermediary country, often Jordan or Cyprus.56
Links with Israel are no longer an official taboo in the UAE, though the issue is not reported 
in local media. Generational change is one factor. Passionate support for the Palestinians, 
embodied by the UAE’s founder Sheikh Zayed al Nahyan,57 has faded. Emirati experts 
emphasise the two countries’ common agenda. ‘We were raised to see Israel as an enemy 
which occupied Arab countries’, argued the head of an Abu Dhabi think tank. ‘The reality 
now is that they are there whether you like it or not. We have common interests with 
them – and it’s about Iran, about interests, not emotions.’58 In the assessment of a former 
UAE diplomat, the current Iranian threat is akin to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, 
which paved the way for a previously unacceptable US military presence in Saudi Arabia. 
‘If it wasn’t for the Palestinian issue, this relationship with Israel would be very public and 
it would be very welcome because we need their military equipment and technology. But 
the relationship will remain under the radar.’59 
In the words of Jamal al-Suwaidi, the influential founder of the Emirates Center for Stra-
tegic Studies and Research: 
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55   David D. Kirkpatrick and Azam Ahmed, ‘Hacking a Prince, an Emir and a Journalist to Impress a 
Client’, The New York Times, 31 August 2018. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/31/world/
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The Palestinian cause is no longer at the forefront of Arabs’ interests, as it used to 
be for long decades; it has sharply lost priority in light of the challenges, threats 
and problems that face countries of the region, altering their list of priorities as 
well as their perception of threats to their national security and the position of 
Israel within these threats compared to other threats posed, primarily by Iran, 
Hezbollah and terrorist groups, among others.60 
Dissenting views, however, can be heard, unlike on other more sensitive issues. ‘I am 
against normalisation’, says Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, a political scientist. ‘I am against 
dropping the Palestinian issue because others are capitalising on it politically. Although 
Palestine is not the number one issue it is still an issue, in the heart maybe, not so much 
in the mind.’61 Still, state media controls illuminate Emirati priorities: Israeli media are 
not blocked online, unlike Qatari-affiliated sites in English or Arabic and Iranian media in 
Arabic.62 
Another factor is official hostility to Islamists, including Hamas, with its links to the 
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. The feeling is mutual: Emirati aid for Jerusalem’s Al-Aqsa 
Mosque is condemned by Hamas. Arabic and English-language media outlets associated 
with the Brotherhood, Turkey and Qatar routinely expose and condemn UAE links to 
Israel. Qatari-based Al Jazeera TV is an important source, as is Middle East Eye in London. 
Emiratis recall, by way of retaliation, that the first Israeli mission in the Gulf opened in 
Doha in 1996. The hashtag #ArabZionists is used in abusive Twitter exchanges. Emirati 
backing for Mohammed Dahlan, the former Fatah security chief in Gaza and an adviser to 
Mohammed Bin Zayed, has made Palestinians vocal in their condemnation of Abu Dhabi. 
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas is deeply hostile to Dahlan.63 In 2018, the UAE 
reportedly made financial aid to Gaza conditional upon the establishment of a governing 
council made up of civilians, with Hamas representatives, but headed by Dahlan. Egypt 
agreed to the proposal but Hamas rejected it and the promised funds never arrived.64 The 
Hamas decision in 2017 to sever its association with the Brotherhood does not appear to 
have reduced Emirati hostility.65
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The UAE has played a role in growing people-to-people contact. Emirati (and Bahraini) 
teams took part in the prestigious Giro d’Italia cycle race, whose opening stages began in 
Israel in May 2018, drawing condemnation from the BDS movement for ‘sports-washing 
of Israel’s occupation and apartheid’.66 An Israeli judo star took part in an international 
contest in 2017 in Abu Dhabi but was not permitted to display the Israeli flag. In October 
2018, however, Israel’s Minister of Culture and Sport Miri Regev attended another judo 
competition in Abu Dhabi and listened tearfully as the national anthem Hatikvah was 
played for the first time, to the fury of Emiratis (and others) opposed to normalisation. 
One keenly watched question is whether Israel will be invited to take part in the presti-
gious Expo 2020 Dubai.67 Minister of Communications Ayoob Kara, a member of Israel’s 
Druze minority and a Netanyahu loyalist, was invited to Dubai for an international confer-
ence in October 2018. Echoing his prime minister, Kara boasts that Israel’s relations with 
the Arab world are better than ever before. ‘The name of the game is the Iranian threat, not 
the Palestinian question’, he insists.68 In 2018, polling in Israel showed that the UAE was 
the second Arab country, after Egypt, that Israelis wanted to visit.69 
Saudi Arabia and Israel
In the wake of the 2006 Lebanon War, signs of a meeting of minds between Israel, Saudi 
and other Gulf states were increasingly visible at the diplomatic level – most eye-catch-
ingly in the Olmert–Bandar encounter. Then US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice found 
a January 2007 gathering of GCC, Egyptian and Jordanian foreign ministers in Kuwait 
remarkable for its lack of interest in the Palestinian question. ‘Iran is number one, two, 
three and four’, she later wrote.70 ‘Suddenly the MEPP [Middle East Peace Process] fades 
into insignificance and you are beginning to get a strategic alignment between Israeli and 
Saudi interests,’ recalled a former western ambassador to the kingdom.71 Still, the API was 
relaunched at the 2007 Arab League Summit in Riyadh and duly welcomed as a ‘positive 
signal’ by the US.72 
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Around the same time, Israeli officials started to publicly emphasise the ‘substantive 
change’ of deep Arab anxiety about the threat from Iran. Amos Gilad, the influential direc-
tor of the Defense Ministry’s Political-Military Affairs Bureau, pointed to opportunities for 
enhanced relations with Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, based on common threat percep-
tion. Saudi irritation with the Palestinians was another factor after King Abdullah brokered 
the Mecca Agreement between Fatah and Hamas in February 2007, only to see it collapse a 
few months later. The Saudi Foreign Minister, Saud al-Faisal, attended the Annapolis Con-
ference that November but stated that normalisation of relations with Israel would come 
only as a result of peace and not before it. A clearer sign of the improving relationship was 
Olmert’s agreement to include Saudis in a committee of religious leaders administering 
the Muslim holy places on Jerusalem’s Haram al-Sharif, which had long been the preserve 
of the Jordanian government, a status enshrined in the 1994 Peace Treaty. Prince Turki bin 
Faisal, former head of the Saudi General Intelligence Presidency (GIP) and ambassador to 
London and Washington (after Bandar), took to participating in track II fora with former 
and serving Israeli officials. One held in Britain in October 2008 focused on reviving the 
API. It was billed as a private event but was reported in Israeli media.73 
Saudi public positions remained critical of Israel in periods of tension, especially during 
Operation Cast Lead in Gaza, launched in December 2008, when 1,400 Palestinians, 
including hundreds of civilians, were killed. Inter-Arab differences, however, were clear, 
with the Saudis, Kuwaitis and Egyptians boycotting an emergency summit convened by 
Qatar because of Doha’s backing for Hamas.74 Shortly afterwards came what was inter-
preted as Saudi acquiescence to Israeli military action against the Palestinian Islamist 
movement, involving air strikes in Sudan against arms convoys being sent from Iran to 
Gaza. US State Department cables showed the Israelis first mounted a diplomatic cam-
paign to stop the weapons being delivered via Sudan. When that failed, they carried out 
long-distance raids along the Red Sea in January and February 2009,75 giving prior notifi-
cation to the Saudis.76 By 2009, according to the deputy head of Israel’s National Security 
Council, ‘senior professionals in the intelligence and security fields from Israel and the 
Gulf countries were collaborating’.77
In September that year, the US, Britain and France announced that Iran had been con-
structing a secret, second uranium enrichment facility in Fordow, near Qom. Unconfirmed 
reports suggested a visit to Saudi Arabia in 2010 by the Mossad Director, Meir Dagan, who 
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was credited with a far more proactive secret alliance-building strategy (including oper-
ations targeting Iran) than his cautious predecessor. ‘Israel and the Gulf states were in 
the same boat,’ commented David Meidan, who ran the agency’s Tevel political action 
and liaison department under Dagan.78 ‘All of a sudden the Mossad was teaching Farsi’, 
another veteran recalled.79
Signalling also began about possible Saudi–Israeli military coordination. In July 2009, the 
Sunday Times reported that the Saudis had agreed to turn a blind eye to an Israeli attack 
on Iran’s nuclear facilities.80 Experts were sceptical about this and similar stories – always 
denied by Riyadh – in years to come. ‘Joint Israeli–Saudi diplomatic and military coordina-
tion makes for good news copy, but it is probably fiction,’ was one academic’s judgement.81 
However, well-connected Saudi, Israeli and western sources with access to classified 
information suggest that agreement was indeed reached to stand down Saudi air defences 
to allow Israeli overflights.82 Ehud Barak, Netanyahu’s defence minister, recorded later 
that it was only in mid-2010 that he felt that Israel had a workable plan for an attack on 
Iran, despite continuing US (as well as internal Israel) opposition.83 
In the turbulent Arab Spring year of 2011, Saudi and Emirati anger over the overthrow 
of Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak – and Obama’s hesitant initial response but subsequent 
acquiescence in that – consequently reinforced long-standing hostility towards Islamist 
movements, including Hamas. The steady deterioration of the crisis in Syria and the 
growing role played by Iran and Hezbollah after 2012 were other factors of convergence 
between Israel and the GCC. 
By the summer of 2012, however, Israel no longer believed that a strike on Iran would be 
possible – principally because of the damage it would do to relations with the US given 
Obama’s opposition.84 Following Hassan Rouhani’s election as president, the P5+1 negoti-
ations on the Iranian nuclear issue accelerated, reaching an interim agreement in Geneva 
in November 2013. Netanyahu’s messaging emphasised the negatives: ‘The dangers of 
a nuclear-armed Iran and the emergence of other threats in our region have led many 
of our Arab neighbours to finally recognise that Israel is not their enemy,’ he told the 
UN General Assembly a few weeks earlier. ‘This affords us the opportunity to overcome 
historic animosities and build new relationships, new friendships, new hopes. Israel wel-
comes engagement with the wider Arab world. We hope that our common interests and 
common challenges will help us forge a more peaceful future.’85 It was at this time that 
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Saudi Arabia and the UAE ‘made common cause with Netanyahu’s government in pres-
suring us,’ in the words of a senior Obama aide.86 Yousef al-Otaiba, the well-connected 
UAE ambassador to Washington, was heavily involved in these efforts.87 The Emiratis were 
more open about their contacts with the Israelis than the Saudis.88 Agreement on Iran did 
not, however, mean agreement on the Palestinian issue. In 2014, in the wake of that sum-
mer’s assault on Gaza, Netanyahu reportedly met Prince Bandar to discuss a Saudi effort 
to relaunch the peace process in order to unite the region against Tehran, but talks on a 
draft document collapsed.89
Like the Emiratis, the Saudis have engaged Israeli companies, especially in the security 
sphere. One was a subcontractor in the high-tech barrier constructed from 2014 by the 
European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS)  along the kingdom’s 600-
mile border with Iraq, according to a senior veteran of the Israeli defence establishment.90 
The National Cyber Security Directorate set up in the prime minister’s office in 2011, was 
a key player. In 2012, when hackers breached the computer system of Saudi Aramco, the 
national oil company, Israeli businesses were involved on an ‘ongoing basis’ through off-
shore companies.91 In 2018, it was reported that the Israeli company NOS had supplied 
the software used to track murdered journalist Jamal Khashoggi.92 Israel reportedly sold 
drones to Saudi Arabia via South Africa93 but denied that it had sold its ‘Iron Dome’ system 
to defend the kingdom from missile attacks by Yemeni Houthi rebels.94 In 2018 Israeli 
media (subject to routine military censorship) reported for the first time that the IDF 
chief of staff and his Saudi counterpart had met at a Washington conference for com-
manders of US-allied armies.95 The Ministry of Defence in Riyadh denied the story.96 
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Intelligence Cooperation
The nature and extent of Israeli–Saudi 
intelligence cooperation remains 
a closely-guarded secret. Unoffi-
cial Saudi spokesmen admit that it 
exists but insist it is narrowly con-
fined to Iran and counter-terrorism. 
In the words of one well-connected 
commentator, it takes place ‘at middle management level’.97 ‘Fetishising non-existent 
collaboration between #Saudi/GCC states and #Israel has become a trend in western 
media/think tank circles,’ was a typically dismissive argument.98 A typical Saudi claim 
is that the Israelis are exaggerating for their own propaganda purposes.
Foreign governments with close connections to both countries and no particular axe to 
grind believe that the two maintain a hot line for emergency contact as well as holding 
regular talks. ‘There is now contiguity between the Israelis and Saudis’, says a former senior 
western intelligence official. ‘You have effectively the kind of security relations between 
countries that exist when they share a border. There are practical things that need to be 
sorted out, so you end up with a routine relationship on a regular basis which can then 
create more senior contact and a more strategic outlook on both sides.’99 In 2013, Bandar 
bin Sultan, by this point head of the Saudi GIP, met Mossad Director Tamir Pardo at a 
London hotel.100 GIP officials were ‘pleased as punch’, a specialist newsletter reported in 
October 2016. ‘There has never been such active cooperation between the two countries, 
in terms of analysis, human intelligence and interception on Iran and movements loyal to 
it such as Hezbollah, the Houthis and the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Units.’101 
Well-placed Saudi sources complain, however, that Israel has not always responded to 
requests for intelligence, even when submitted via the US. They cite the example of the 
2009 attacks on Hamas weapons convoys in Sudan – illustrating Israel’s capabilities – 
and complain that it did not cooperate in interdicting Iranian missiles delivered from 
Bandar Abbas to al-Hudaydah in Yemen. There are also indications of a debate within 
the Israeli intelligence community about the value of links with the Saudis and reticence 
about responding to their requests.102 In some quarters, the relationship is described as a 
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‘one-way street’ in which Israel gives the Saudis information without getting anything of 
similar value in return. Israel’s highly advanced technological capabilities, it is said, are 
not matched by detailed Saudi knowledge of Yemeni tribes, Arabs in Iranian Khuzestan or 
Iranian minorities in Balochistan, according to an Israeli with long experience of dealing 
with Riyadh.103 Other factors limit the extent of the relationship. ‘I can understand that the 
Israelis would not have given the Saudis sensitive information because they couldn’t be 
confident that the Saudis would have protected the source – and that would have created 
a serious counter-intelligence problem,’ says a second former senior intelligence officer. 
‘They are not natural partners. They have very different intelligence cultures. The Israe-
lis are world-class and the Gulfies are not. The Israelis would not go into a relationship 
unless they get some proper dividend.’104
Deepening Ties
Tantalising glimpses of deepening Saudi–Israeli relations have been multiplying since 
King Salman bin Abdulaziz came to the throne in 2015 and the JCPoA was signed with 
Iran. In June of that year, former Saudi general Anwar Eshki held a public meeting in 
Washington with Dore Gold, who was about to become director general of the Israeli Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs. Five earlier sessions had been held secretly.105 Eshki visited Israel 
the following year with a delegation of academics and businessmen, though he publicly 
maintained the familiar official line: ‘There will not be peace first with the Arab states, but 
rather with the Palestinian brothers first’.106 
In April 2016, Egypt agreed to transfer back to Saudi Arabia the Red Sea islands of Tiran 
and Sanafir at the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba (leased to Egypt in 1950), sparking protests 
against the Cairo government and accusations that their relinquishing was prompted by 
promises of Saudi investment. Israel was consulted under the terms of the 1979 Peace 
Treaty. The Saudis said they respected the terms of the treaty, though Israeli officials were 
reluctant to discuss the issue publicly for fear of embarrassing President Sisi.107 ‘Despite 
the disavowal of any direct contacts over this issue – and other important issues – over 
the years, the very fact that Saudi Arabia now undertakes to uphold in practice the obliga-
tions assumed by Egypt under the Peace Treaty means that Israel’s place in the region is 
no longer perceived by […] Saudi Arabia as an anomaly to be corrected,’ commented an 
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Israeli think tank. ‘This is a far cry from “normalisation”… which remains a dirty word in 
the Arab dictionary. But it is nevertheless a welcome ray of light, demonstrating the bene-
fits of cooperation and coordination.’108 
Salman’s reign saw far-reaching changes involving his son Mohammed, who he first 
appointed as defence minister and deputy crown prince, and later promoted to crown 
prince in June 2017. Mohammed bin Salman (MbS)’s ascent was accompanied by public 
messages about hostility to Iran and openness to Israel. MbS went so far as to call Iran’s 
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei ‘a new Hitler’.109 Netanyahu is said to have com-
missioned a profile of MbS from Israel’s intelligence community.110 From a Saudi lobbyist in 
Washington came a call for a ‘collaborative alliance’ with Israel to help Saudi desalination 
plans, part of MbS’s ambitious Vision 2030 blueprint for economic reform and diversi-
fication. Both countries faced ‘constant threats from extremist groups that are directly 
supported by the totalitarian government of Iran’, argued Salman Ansari.111 The $50bn 
NEOM project, on the country’s northwest coast near the borders of Jordan, Egypt and 
Israel, seemed certain to attract Israeli interest and expertise.112 The Straits of Tiran, whose 
blockade by Egypt was the immediate trigger for the Arab–Israeli war of June 1967, now 
faced a brighter future, reflected the Saudi commentator Abdelrahman al-Rashed, ‘one 
where peace and prosperity prevail’.113 ‘Since announcing the launch of NEOM’, observed 
an Arab critic, ‘the regime has embarked on an aggressive media campaign that is paving 
the way for the normalisation of ties with Israel, using the country’s most renowned cul-
tural producers’.114 
Trump’s announcement of his controversial decision to move the US embassy from Tel 
Aviv to Jerusalem in December 2017 was initially met by a muted response from Riyadh. 
Details of the President’s proposed ‘deal of the century’ were discussed by his Middle 
108   Eran Lerman and Joshua Teitelbaum, ‘Sailing through the Straits: The Meaning for Israel of 
Restored Saudi Sovereignty over Tiran and Sanafir Islands’, BESA Center Perspectives Paper 340, 17 
April 2016. Available at https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/meaning-israel-restored-saudi-
sovereignty-tiran-sanafir-islands/ (accessed 6 March 2019). 
109   Thomas L. Friedman, ‘Saudi Arabia’s Arab Spring, at Last’, The New York Times, 23 November 
2017. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/23/opinion/saudi-prince-mbs-arab-spring.html 
(accessed 6 March 2019). 
110   Interview, Israeli source.
111   Salman Al-Ansari, ‘How Israel can contribute to Saudi’s Vision 2030’, The Hill, 10 November 2016. 
Available at https://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/international-affairs/300447-how-israel-can-
contribute-to-saudis-vision-2030 (accessed 6 March 2019).
112   Max Schindler, ‘Israeli Companies Talking to Saudi Arabia about $500B. “Smart City”’, The 
Jerusalem Post, 25 October 2017. Available at https://www.jpost.com/Business-and-Innovation/Israeli-
companies-likely-talking-to-Saudi-Arabia-about-500-bil-smart-city-508429 (accessed 6 March 
2019). 
113   Abdulrahman al-Rashed, ‘Lessons from Tiran Island, a Witness to our History’, Al Arabiya English, 
18 August 2018. Available at https://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2018/08/18/
Lessons-from-Tiran-Island-a-witness-to-our-history.html# (accessed 6 March 2019).
114   Rosie Bsheer, ‘How Mohammed bin Salman Has Transformed Saudi Arabia’, The Nation, 21 
May 2018. Available at https://www.thenation.com/article/how-mohammed-bin-salman-has-
transformed-saudi-arabia/ (accessed 6 March 2019). 
Israel, the Arab Gulf States and the Limits of Cooperation 23 
East envoy (and son-in-law) Jared Kushner with MbS. Leaks suggested a key role for the 
Saudis in pressuring the Palestinians to accept the deal. Messaging about Israel intensified 
during the three-week trip made by the crown prince to the US in the spring of 2018 just as 
the weekly Gaza ‘March of Return’ protests were starting and unarmed Palestinians were 
being killed and wounded regularly by IDF snipers. MbS met pro-Israel American Jewish 
leaders, telling them the Palestinians should accept Trump’s proposals or ‘shut up and 
stop complaining’. He made clear that the Palestinian issue was not a priority for his gov-
ernment nor for the Saudi public. ‘There are far more pressing and more important issues 
to deal with, such as Iran.’115 The prince acknowledged Jewish claims to Israel, declaring: 
‘I believe the Palestinians and the Israelis have the right to have their own land.’116 Soon 
afterwards, Palestinian demonstrators in Gaza burned pictures of the Saudi royals.117 
Nevertheless, MbS was reined in by his father on the Palestinian issue, with King Salman 
announcing that the 2018 Arab League Summit in Dhahran would be named the Al-Quds 
(Jerusalem) summit.118 Later, a senior Arab diplomat in Riyadh was quoted as saying: ‘In 
Saudi Arabia, the king is the one who decides on this issue now, not the crown prince.’119 
Israeli media largely ignored the summit and its implications, noted one analyst. ‘They 
were busy feeding the Israeli public juicy tales of a steamy love affair between Jerusalem 
and Riyadh.’120 Later, the king reiterated that the Palestinian cause remained a priority. The 
resumption of previously suspended Saudi financial aid to the cash-strapped Palestinian 
Authority (PA) was seen as an expression of this commitment as well as a response to 
Qatari support for Hamas in Gaza.121 
Another noteworthy development took place when an Air India flight flew from Delhi 
over Saudi Arabia and landed at Ben Gurion Airport. Agreement on this was a significant 
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move, though it fell short of long-standing US-led efforts to persuade the Saudis to allow 
El Al, Israel’s national airline, to do the same. It was hailed publicly as an unmistakable 
signal of normalisation, which neatly fitted Netanyahu’s narrative of relations with key 
Arab states ‘improving beyond imagination’ without any link to the Palestinian issue.122 It 
was, however, significantly qualified. ‘Kerry came and asked the Saudis to let El Al fly 
over their territory’, mused a former Israeli security official. ‘And who got permission? Air 
India! it shows that the Saudis can be flexible but they cannot betray the Palestinians, not 
because they love them or trust them, but because it is an issue for their people and the 
religious establishment – and also because of their position vis-à-vis Iran.’123 In mid-June, 
GIP Director Khaled bin Ali al-Humaidan reportedly joined Kushner and Trump’s envoy 
Jason Greenblatt – as well as Mossad Director Yossi Cohen, Jordanian and Egyptian coun-
terparts – at a meeting in Aqaba to discuss regional security.124 
Bin Salman’s rising star faded dramatically in October 2018 in the wake of the murder of 
Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. Amidst international condemnation 
– and the constantly changing Saudi response – the Israeli government was initially silent, 
though it did not follow the example of Arab leaders who openly rallied to the Saudis’ 
defence or blamed the outrage on a campaign by Turkey and Qatar. When Netanyahu 
eventually addressed the issue, he deplored a ‘horrendous’ incident, but warned that ‘it is 
important for the stability of the world, for the region…that Saudi Arabia remains stable’.125 
Israeli commentators argued that Trump’s description of Saudi Arabia as a ‘steadfast ally’ 
was inspired by his belief that the kingdom’s stability was crucial for Israel as well as to the 
confrontation with Iran. Netanyahu’s position was ‘much appreciated’ in Riyadh.126 Israel’s 
intelligence community was described as seeing great potential for cooperation with its 
Saudi counterparts but alarmed by MbS’s recklessness.127 ‘Let’s hope that if he wants to 
assassinate people again – say commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards – he’ll 
consult people with some relevant experience’, wrote Yedioth Ahronoth’s Ronen Bergman.128 
One of the two officials and close aides to MbS blamed for the Khashoggi killing was 
reportedly the most senior Saudi to have visited Israel, underlining the very high level of 
the clandestine contact.129 
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Overall, Saudi Arabia’s strategic relationship with Israel is marked by considerable reti-
cence. It lags behind the smaller Gulf states with regards to people-to-people contacts, 
refusing, for example, to allow Israelis to attend international sporting events.130 ‘Not 
hosting a chess tournament with Israeli participants is a statement of our resolution for a 
free Palestine’, commented one columnist. ‘As the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, 
Saudi Arabia bears the weight of the Muslim world and this form of commitment is nec-
essary to ward off grand Zionist designs for the region.’131 It has ignored calls from Israel 
for more open contacts. ‘Who supported Trump’s decision to withdraw from the nuclear 
agreement with Iran? Israel, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states,’ said Israeli Defence Min-
ister Avigdor Lieberman.132 ‘So I think it’s time for those moderate countries to ‘come 
out of the closet’ and start talking openly. Just like there’s an axis of evil, it’s time for the 
Middle East to also have an axis of moderate countries.’ In December 2018, Netanyahu 
announced that he was working towards normalisation with the Saudis, fuelling specu-
lations about a possible public meeting with MbS.133 Shortly afterwards, it was reported 
that a new arrangement had been put in place to allow Israel businessmen to quietly visit 
the kingdom.134 But around the same time, a secret Israeli foreign ministry report assessed 
that the Saudis were not prepared to go any further in developing overt relations with 
Israel.135 The same point was made explicitly – and publicly – by Prince Turki al-Faisal in 
an unprecedented interview with an Israeli TV channel on the eve of the Warsaw summit, 
in February 2019.136 
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Israel’s relations with Bahrain attract less attention than those of its larger neighbour, but 
they have some special characteristics. The island kingdom’s two-thirds Shiʿa majority, 
the Sunni monarchy’s focus on Iranian hostility and subversion, as well as the Saudi inter-
vention to crush the 2011 uprisings, have bolstered the sense of shared interests. Bahrain’s 
dependence on Saudi Arabia has given it a role as a launcher of trial balloons.137 Its military 
ties to the US create a strong motive to cultivate a good image in Washington. Bahrain fits 
precisely an Israeli diplomat’s assessment that his country’s relations with the Gulf states 
are a function of fear of Iran and the Arabs’ belief in Israel’s influence within the US.138 The 
presence of a small Jewish community is unique in the Gulf and has provided an interfaith 
route for people-to-people contacts. 
Unlike Riyadh, Manama played a limited overt role in the post-Oslo period, inviting Isra-
el’s environment minister to visit in 1994. Relations with Israel subsequently developed 
further. In 2005, King Hamad bragged to the US ambassador about intelligence and secu-
rity contacts with Israel and instructed that official statements stop referring to Israel as 
the ‘Zionist entity’.139 Bahrain’s Foreign Minister said there had been ‘quiet, businesslike 
contacts with Israel for some time’. Public exposure, however, could be controversial, as 
when the foreign minister was criticised by Bahrain’s parliament for meeting his Israeli 
counterpart at the UN in 2007. Still, in July 2009, Sheikh Salman bin Hamad al-Khal-
ifa publicly championed the API as the only means by which to mitigate a conflict that 
‘needlessly impoverishes Palestinians and endangers Israel’s security’140 – rare and explicit 
recognition by an Arab state of Israel’s concerns and notably just months after the latest 
Gaza war. In 2010, an unnamed Bahraini princess underwent medical treatment in an 
Israeli hospital – as, it is widely rumoured and occasionally reported, have other Gulf 
royals over many years.141 
Facing international criticism for discrimination and repression against the Shiʿa popu-
lation, the ruling Al Khalifa family have emphasised the rights of non-Muslims, including 
Jews. In 2008, King Hamad announced that Bahraini Jews who had emigrated to the US 
and Britain would be able to return home.142 The appointment of a Jewish woman as 
ambassador to Washington attracted positive publicity as did the declaration, attributed 
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to the King, condemning the Arab 
boycott of Israel and announcing 
that Bahraini citizens were allowed 
to visit the country.143 However, 
formal trade restrictions are still in 
place, as such, goods of Israeli origin 
or bearing Israeli trademarks are 
banned. In December 2017, after Trump’s announcement that the US embassy would 
move to Jerusalem, a delegation of Bahraini political and religious figures visited the city, 
though the timing was reportedly coincidental.144 Organised by a pro-monarchy organisa-
tion called This is Bahrain,145 it was condemned by Palestinian spokespeople and by the 
outlawed Al-Wefaq National Islamic Society, Bahrain’s main opposition party. Bahrain’s 
foreign minister, Khalid bin Ahmed al-Khalifa, tweeted: ‘It’s not helpful to pick a fight 
with the US over side issues while we together fight the clear and present danger of 
The Theo-Fascist Islamic republic’.146
Like the Saudis, the UAE and Israel, Bahrain opposed the JCPoA and applauded Trump’s 
withdrawal from it. In 2013, at the peak of the Syrian crisis, Bahrain became the first Gulf 
state to declare Hezbollah a terrorist organisation – illustrating its animosity to Iranian 
proxies.147 It later announced the arrest of citizens accused of forming a local branch of 
Hezbollah. In May 2018, the foreign minister declared that Israel had the right to defend 
itself after Iranian forces in Syria fired more than a dozen missiles at Israeli targets in the 
occupied Golan Heights. His widely-reported comments were lauded by Israel as a show 
of ‘historic support for the State of 
Israel in the face of Iranian aggression 
[which] reflects the new coalition 
being created in the Middle East’. 
The unprecedented statement, made 
on Twitter, was, however, not offi-
cially published by Bahrain’s Ministry 
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of Foreign Affairs.148 In late 2018, soon 
after Netanyahu’s visit to Oman, 
reports multiplied of an impending 
invitation to Manama for Israel’s 
prime minister or even the estab-
lishment of diplomatic relations.149 
Khalid bin Ahmed praised Netanya-
hu’s understanding of the importance 
of Saudi Arabia to regional stability in 
the wake of the Khashoggi affair.150 
Oman and Israel
Israel’s links with Oman date back to the early 1970’s when it secretly supplied military 
advice and possibly weapons to fight the Dhofar Rebellion.151 Its motives were similar to 
the clandestine support it gave Yemeni royalists fighting Egyptian-backed rebels a decade 
earlier. Britain brokered the initial relationship.152 Oman’s independent foreign policy was 
underlined when it refused, like Morocco and Sudan, to sever ties with Egypt after Anwar 
Sadat’s taboo-breaking visit to Israel in 1977 and the 1979 Peace Treaty. Secret contacts 
continued in its wake via the Mossad.153 
The relationship only became public in 1994 when Muscat became the first Gulf capital to 
host an Israeli prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin. Oman’s Foreign Minister attended Rabin’s 
funeral the following year. In 1996, Israel and Oman agreed on the reciprocal opening of 
trade representative offices. In October 2000, when the Second Intifada began, Oman 
closed its office in Tel Aviv though the Israeli mission in Muscat continued to function 
quietly. Multilateral connections were not affected.154 The Middle East Desalination 
Research Centre (MEDRC), devoted to water scarcity solutions, was established in Muscat 
in 1996. Israeli experts visit it regularly but are not based there.155 The Israeli representative 
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on its council is the head of the Foreign Ministry’s Middle East and peace process divi-
sion.156
Netanyahu’s visit to Oman in October 2018157 was the first declared one by an Israeli prime 
minister to any Arab state (other than Jordan or Egypt) at a time when there was no Israeli–
Palestinian peace process – with not even any attempts at going through the motions of 
serious negotiation. The last US-brokered talks, overseen by John Kerry, had ended in 
2014. Shortly before the visit, President Abbas also met the Sultan in Muscat, suggesting 
a Omani mediating role. That impression was reinforced when the Omani foreign minis-
ter went to see Abbas in Ramallah shortly afterwards. Israel’s statement, however, made 
no mention of the Palestinians. It called the visit a ‘significant step in implementing the 
policy outlined by Prime Minister Netanyahu to strengthen ties with the countries of the 
region, while leveraging Israel’s advantages in security, technology and the economy.’ The 
delegation notably included Mossad Director Cohen. ‘It would not be baseless to assume 
that the Mossad had a hand not only in planning the trip but also in assisting Qaboos in 
his rule for years,’ commented one Israeli analyst.158 Soon afterwards Israel’s transporta-
tion minister attended a Muscat conference to promote a regional railway project linking 
Haifa with Jordan and Saudi Arabia.
Reactions on Arabic social media 
reflected controversy around any-
thing suggesting normalisation with 
Israel. The Twitter hashtag _ينامع
عيبطتلا_دض# (‘Omanis against 
normalisation’, pictured left) was 
used to denounced the move as 
‘shameful’ and demanded that any 
contact with Israel takes place only 
within the framework of the API.159 Supporters of the BDS movement vilified Qaboos 
as just another Arab dictator ignoring popular sentiment. ‘Our Arab brothers […] have 
stabbed us in the front and the back, abandoning us politically while embracing Israel,’ 
complained a Palestinian commentator. ‘Israeli flags could soon be flying in the skies of 
some Gulf states, while they pressure the Palestinian leadership into accepting a “peace” 
deal that is unacceptable.’160 Netanyahu’s framing of the visit struck a familiar note: ‘We 
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(accessed 15 March 2019).
157   ‘Israeli PM Netanyahu Makes Rare Visit to Oman’, Reuters, 26 October 2018. Available at 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-oman/israeli-pm-netanyahu-makes-rare-visit-to-oman-
idUSKCN1N01WN (accessed 6 March 2019). 
158   Zvi Bar’el, ‘The Sultan’s New Friend: Just Why Did Netanyahu Visit Oman?’, Haaretz, 28 October 
2018. Available at https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-the-sultan-s-new-friend-just-
why-did-bibi-visit-oman-1.6595856 (accessed 6 March 2019). 
159   ‘An Israeli–Omani Handshake Ignites social Networking Sites’ [in Arabic], BBC Arabic, 27 October 
2018. Available at http://www.bbc.com/arabic/trending-45878432 (accessed 6 March 2019). 
160   Kamel Hawwash, ‘Israel has Done Nothing to Deserve Normalisation with the Arab World’, Middle 
East Eye, 12 November 2018. Available at https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/israel-has-done-
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always thought that if we solved the Palestinian problem, it would open up the doors to 
peace with the broader Arab world,’ he said shortly before. ‘And that’s certainly true if 
you could do it. But it may mean that equally true, and perhaps even truer, is that if you 
open up to the Arab world and you normalise relations with them, it will open the door 
for an eventual reconciliation and peace with the Palestinians. We should do both but I 
think you should not underestimate the openness and the thirst in the Arab world today 
for Israel.’161 The visit apparently took place with the Saudis’ agreement, since it involved 
flying through their airspace. Oman afterwards reiterated its support for the API.
This highly unusual visit – the first by an Israeli leader in over two decades – attracted 
close attention in the Gulf and beyond, but Netanyahu’s critics were not impressed, reit-
erating that without significant concessions to the Palestinians, relations with Arab states 
would continue to be limited, security-focused and largely secret. Netanyahu’s purpose, 
according to one, was to ‘prove that there was no basis to left-wing claims that the occu-
pation and Israeli settlements hinder normalisation of ties with the Arab world’.162 
Israel and Qatar
Qatar is the odd man out in terms of Gulf links with Israel. It has simultaneously been the 
most open and most hostile because of its close relations with Hamas, Iran and Turkey. It 
played an important role in the Gaza Strip after 2012, when the Hamas leadership moved 
its headquarters from Damascus to Doha after criticising Bashar al-Assad’s suppression of 
Syria’s Arab Spring. Recently, it has become a high-profile intermediary between the Isla-
mist movement and Israel. Its involvement appeared instrumental in preventing serious 
escalation in 2018. It raised its profile with the start of the Saudi and Emirati-led blockade 
in the summer of 2017, seeking to influence the US administration and American Jewish 
opinion. Its approach is pragmatic and non-ideological. ‘Qataris put their eggs in many 
baskets’, one senior official quipped.163 ‘Qatar’s relationship with Hamas and Israel should 
be seen largely within the context of its wider policy of forming contacts with highly diver-
gent groups in order to increase its clout and position as a potential mediator,’ argues 
Allen J. Fromherz in Qatar: A Modern History.164 
Qatar’s known links with Israel began with the multilateral talks that followed the 1991 
Madrid Peace Conference. In 1996, it was the first GCC member state to launch trade 
nothing-deserve-normalisation-arab-world (accessed 6 March 2019). 
161   Tovah Lazaroff, ‘Netanyahu Makes Historical Visit to Oman’, The Jerusalem Post, 26 October 2018. 
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164   Allen J. Fromherz, Qatar: A Modern History (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2017), 
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relations with Israel. Doha distanced itself as the Israeli–Palestinian peace process stag-
nated, but refrained from severing relations.165 Prime Minister Barak met Sheikh Hamad 
bin Jassim, Qatar’s foreign minister, at the UN in September 2000. Shimon Peres, deputy 
prime minister, visited Doha in January 2007. In 2008, Foreign Minister Livni gave the 
keynote address at the Doha Forum. Livni had been invited to the event in 2006 but 
cancelled because Hamas representatives were present. Characteristically for Qatar, her 
appearance was followed by a meeting between the Emir and Hamas leader Khaled Meshal. 
The formal relationship ended only in 2009 when Israel’s Doha trade office was closed 
after the Gaza War. Undeclared contacts continued. Qatar spent hundreds of millions of 
dollars on rebuilding and supplying humanitarian aid to Gaza. Sheikh Hamad visited the 
strip in 2012 during Mohamed Morsi’s presidency in Egypt and was hailed for breaking 
the siege, but criticised by the PA and Israel for legitimising Hamas and perpetuating the 
split with the PLO.166 ‘With Qatar there is a question mark because on the one hand they 
have been helpful with Gaza’s economic recovery, probably the most generous of the Gulf 
states, but they host some of the worst terrorist organisations in the Middle East,’ said a 
senior Israeli source.167 In 2013, Qatar secured Arab League agreement to modify the API 
to include the concept of land swaps – moving away from the unqualified demand of a 
return to the 1967 borders.
After the 2014 Gaza war, Doha established the Qatari Committee for the Reconstruction 
of Gaza. Its chairman Mohammed al-Emadi visited Israel regularly since then, developing 
a good relationship with his Israeli counterpart, Yoav Mordechai, head of the Coordina-
tor of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT).168 During an early trip, Emadi 
secured Israeli agreement to allow concrete into Gaza after it was banned because it was 
used to construct tunnels for Hamas.169 Even with reconstruction efforts, conditions in the 
Strip continued to deteriorate. US cuts in funding to UNRWA, the UN Reliefs and Works 
Agency for Palestine Refugees, worsened an already dire situation.170 
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Emadi is described by Israeli media as ‘Qatar’s de facto ambassador to Israel’ and his Gaza 
City office as the ‘nerve centre of the Israeli defence establishment in the Gaza Strip’.171 
He was involved in efforts to secure the release of two IDF soldiers and the return of 
the remains of two others.172 His activities became increasingly visible after the Saudi-led 
blockade, along with a campaign to welcome prominent American Jewish figures to Doha 
for meetings with the Emir. These included Harvard law professor Alan Dershowitz and 
Morton Klein, president of the Zionist Organization of America. Dershowitz called Qatar 
‘the Israel of the Gulf states’. Klein revealed that Qatari officials promised not to run an Al 
Jazeera documentary critical of Israel’s supporters in the US.173 Doha ordered the expul-
sion of members of Hamas’s military wing, including one linked to efforts to establish 
cells in the West Bank.174 
In the summer of 2018, Lieberman met Qatari Foreign Minister Mohammed bin Abdul-
rahman Al Thani amid efforts to hammer out a ceasefire with Hamas, though the Israeli 
side initially maintained secrecy to avoid embarrassing Egypt. Qatar’s influence reached 
its peak in November 2018 when it delivered the first of six $25 million tranches (to be 
issued monthly) to pay 37,000 Gazan public employees and 50,000 needy families – as 
well as buying fuel to boost electricity generation.175 Recipients were vetted by Israel’s Shin 
Bet security service to ensure they were not Hamas security personnel.176 Nevertheless, 
Netanyahu was accused of supporting Hamas and the Qataris faced criticism for collabo-
rating with Israel. ‘While Qatar is continuing its tradition of aiding the Hamas regime, it is 
also helping Israel avoid another war’, commented one Israeli expert. ‘In that way, every-
one benefits from the wealth and munificence of the tiny emirate’.177 Shortly afterwards, 
Israel’s ambassador to the US issued a remarkable public statement thanking Qatar, along 
with Egypt and the UN, for their efforts to improve the situation in Gaza – reportedly in 
response to a Qatari demand.178 Doha responded by describing itself as working ‘hand-
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2016. Available at https://www.debka.com/yaalon-counts-on-the-qatari-envoy-for-solving-hamas-
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in-hand’ with Israel and the UN. ‘The Qataris want their own relationship with Israel but 
anyone else who does that is subject to accusations of treachery,’ complained a former 
Saudi official.179
Qatar, despite its differences with the UAE and Bahrain, has also encouraged peo-
ple-to-people contact, allowing Israeli athletes to take part in international competitions, 
including the 2022 World Cup.
Kuwait and Israel
Kuwait deviates from the GCC pattern 
of increasingly close and visible ties 
and convergence of strategic views 
with Israel. Arab nationalism, a 
sometimes assertive national assem-
bly, an older leader, less dominant 
state security structures and a history 
of sympathy with the Palestinians are 
all factors. Little evidence is available 
about discreet, let alone clandestine 
connections such as those that exist 
with all other Gulf states. In 2014, 
Lieberman said secret talks were 
under way with Kuwait, which the 
Gulf state immediately denied.180
Individual Kuwaitis occasionally call for normal relations with Israel.181 However, oppo-
sition to normalisation is far more common, at least on social media.182 Kuwait’s Deputy 
Foreign Minister Khaled Al-Jarallah declared in January 2019 that his country has no inten-
tion of normalising ties with Israel. ‘All “voices” calling for normalisation’, he added, ‘were 
“individual voices” and did not represent the official Kuwaiti stance.’183
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Hostility to Israel is evident in both Kuwait’s domestic political discourse and its diplo-
macy.184 In October 2017 the speaker of the national assembly won widespread approval 
when he shouted ‘child killers’ at Israeli MPs who were taking part in the Inter-Parliamen-
tary Union Assembly in Saint Petersburg.185 Kuwait has refused to attend regional events in 
which Israel is participating, such as the 2014 World Future Energy Summit in Abu Dhabi. 
‘The decision comes in line with Kuwait’s commitment to boycott all forms of interaction 
with the Zionist regime’, the energy ministry said.186 It has announced plans to open an 
embassy in the occupied Palestinian territory.187 In December 2018, at the UN Security 
Council, Kuwait accused Israel of exaggerating the danger posed by tunnels dug by Hez-
bollah – treated by other GCC states as a terrorist organisation.188 It regularly champions 
the Palestinian cause and highlights Israeli human rights violations in international fora,189 
furthermore banning Israeli citizens from using its national airline.190 The irony is that in 
the wake of the Iraqi invasion of 1990, Kuwait expelled 300,000 Palestinians because of 
the PLO’s support for Saddam Hussein. It took many years before Kuwaiti–Palestinian 
relations recovered.
Kuwait did not join the Saudis, Emiratis and Bahrainis (and Israelis) in greeting Trump’s 
withdrawal from the JCPoA. It has also tried to mediate in the dispute between Qatar and 
the rest of the GCC states.191 
One curiosity is the Kuwait-based online Arabic news site, Al-Jarida, which has acquired 
the reputation of being used to leak news and/or misinformation from Israeli and other 
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sources. In January 2019, it reported 
that the commander of the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guards’ elite ‘Quds 
Force’, Qasem Soleimani, had warned 
that Netanyahu would seek to esca-
late tensions along the Israeli –Syrian 
border in order to boost his popular-
ity in the 2019 elections.192 Netanyahu 
responded to the Al-Jarida story by 
warning Soleimani to examine ‘the 
state of Iranian bases he is trying to establish in Syria’ instead of ‘interfering in the [Israeli] 
elections’.193 Israelis accused him of having planted the story to bolster his security cre-
dentials.194
Conclusion
Israel’s deepening security and commercial ties with the Gulf states reflect regional and 
generational changes. The rise of Iran, the post-Arab Spring confidence of autocratic 
regimes, a growing sense of US disengagement and Palestinian divisions have all con-
tributed to their converging interests – and the increasing though still partial visibility 
of long-secret links. Trump’s confrontational approach to Iran may have the potential 
to translate these ties into something more ambitious. Alternatively, the Middle Eastern 
actors may decide that an inconsistent and impulsive US president is not prepared to do 
enough to challenge or contain Tehran, and thus act independently. Omani and Qatari 
motives differ but also reflect the pragmatic acceptance of Israel as an unassailable 
regional power. Kuwait is conspicuously alone in resisting the trend.
Israel sees ties with the Gulf as an important way of demonstrating its value to Wash-
ington – as well as downplaying the importance of the Palestinian issue. ‘It is doubtful 
whether the scope of [US] aid to Arab countries could have been sustained without the 
support of AIPAC (American Israel Public Affairs Committee, a pro-Israel lobby group) 
and Jewish organisations’, noted Eran Lerman, former Deputy Head of Israel’s National 
Security Council. ‘Arab leaders, including the Saudi heir to the throne and even the Emir 
of Qatar, reflect this insight when they systematically invest in keeping open channels of 
dialogue with leaders of US Jewry.’195 
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If the UAE has been the most forward in developing links with Israel, Saudi Arabia is 
the key to wider change. Yet the kingdom, more than its neighbours, faces constraints in 
terms of domestic, regional and Muslim public opinion – largely because of the legitimacy 
claimed by the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques. It is important to note that no GCC 
state has publicly retreated from the API, which requires the creation of an independent 
Palestinian state in the territories occupied in 1967. That is not compatible with Netanya-
hu’s insistence that the most he will countenance is a ‘state-minus’ and his parallel refusal 
to dismantle illegal settlements. The 2018 Al-Quds Summit reiterated the long-standing 
Saudi position. In December 2018, the Saudis voted against a US-sponsored UN reso-
lution condemning Hamas in Gaza, explaining that it would undermine ‘the two-state 
solution which we aspire to’.196 All Arab states followed suit. 
Nevertheless, Palestinian concern is growing because of multiplying signs of improving 
Israeli ties with the Gulf (and with Sudan and Chad). Nabil Shaath, a former PA foreign 
minister and adviser to Abbas, has publicly questioned the commitment of the Arab League 
and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference to reject normalisation with Israel.197 PLO 
Secretary General Saeb Erekat has warned of a ‘stab in the back’ by Arab states.198 In the 
occupied Palestinian territories, 72 percent believe an alliance already exists between the 
Sunni states and Israel against Iran.199 
Israel has developed greater awareness of the regional context of its conflict with the 
Palestinians. The last full-scale war involving an Arab state was in 1973. Prospects for an 
agreement with the Palestinians have been declining since the Second Intifada and the 
Lebanon War of 2006 reflected the changing Middle Eastern strategic environment. On 
the other hand, the expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, 
the shift to the right in Israel and the debilitating political and geographic split between 
the PLO and Hamas for over a decade have reinforced the sense on both sides that there 
is no ‘partner’ for peace. 
Polling in 2018 found 49 percent of Israelis believe Netanyahu’s argument that it is possible 
to achieve normalisation with Arab states without a peace agreement with the Palestin-
ians; 33 percent do not accept this.200 Political opponents, including prominent veterans 
and Security, 24 May 2018. Available at https://jiss.org.il/en/lerman-not-necessarily-people-dwells-
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of Israel’s defence and security establishment, have repeatedly questioned Netanyahu’s 
approach, pointing out that it will not succeed without concessions to the Palestinians. 
Tamir Pardo, Mossad Director from 2011–15, insists that secret links will not legitimise 
Israel.201 Alliances based on common threats can collapse if those threats recede or new 
positions emerge – for example a Saudi rapprochement with Iran or Israeli annexation of 
parts of the West Bank.
Broadly speaking, expectations on both sides are that links between Israel, Saudi Arabia 
and other Gulf states will continue to grow in the medium term, but without the establish-
ment of overt diplomatic relations, normal trade nor the opening of embassies. For that to 
happen, tangible progress still needs to be made towards resolving the Palestinian ques-
tion. In the Gulf, ruled by modernising hereditary autocracies which prioritise national 
interests over pan-Arab solidarity, Palestine may no longer be the central issue that it was 
once perceived to be – though it remains one with a wide popular and emotional reso-
nance that is unlikely to be simply ignored.202 
*The sources for this paper include interviews with serving and former government 
officials, politicians, businessmen, journalists and experts from Israel, the UAE, Saudi 
Arabia, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Egypt, the occupied Palestinian Territories, the US and 
the UK. Most were conducted in the summer and autumn of 2018. Unless named, the 
sources requested anonymity.
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